" -------------------------' " 0
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
; ------------------------, 5000' -I

Safety data
Wbal official investigators of aircraft accidents have to do is to understand why that accident happened and then, if appropriate. makc recommendations to the aviation regulatory bodies, aircraft accidents are human factors and Controlled Flight into Terrain (CF1T). CFIT accidents are those in which an aeroplane, under the control of its flight crew, is flown inlo terrain (or water) with no awareness in the crew of the impending disaster. Both causes involve complex relationships between the aircraft operation, the technology and the training of the personnel involved. presently flying will be required then (see Figure I ). From inspection of Figure 2 , however, it is evident that the annual accident rate, in terms of hull loss pcr millioD departmes, has been static since 1970 at about 1.5. This fact suggests that any improvement in the accident rate is unlikely to be attained at an affordable cost by technological improvements. Hence, with the number of aircraft doubling in the period, the number of accidents must increase proportionately from about 48 to 96 per annum. The reduction of 50% being so vigorously sought by the airlines will do no more tban maintain the present number of accidents of about one a week. 
Year
[n any discussion of aviation safety it is important to undersland that serious commercial air transport accidents are rare. However, it must be acknowledged that when they do occur there are usually large numbers of fatalities and injuries. ft is such accident figures which colour the public perception of aviation safety, even though air travel is demonstrably one of the safest forms of transport. More people are killed in road accidents world-wide each week than are killed in aircraft accidents in a year. The realisation that travelling to the airport is the most dangerous part of the journey is not yet part of the public's awareness. One of the greatest problems faced by the aviation industry today is how to reduce serious accidents involving commercial transport aeroplanes by at least 50% by the year 2005. Since the number of passengers travelling annually by air has grown at about 6% since 1994, the number flying then will have doubled. In the absence of more aircraft of greatly increased capacity, this estimated figure for passenger traffic implies that about twice as many airliners as are 
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the manufacturers, and possibly the industry at large, to ensure that corrective action is taken to prevent such accidents in future. Many other people, such as families and insurers, also wish "to know what happened", but ITom a different perspective. Because of their keen financial interest, one of the best sources of air accident data is that provided by the aviation insurance brokers themselves through their company, AIRCLAIMS. Figure 3 , which is a summary of scheduled air transport accidents foc 1999, was produced by that finn/. From that figure it can be calculated that there were 31 accidents which rcsulted in the total destruction of the aeroplane, and 33 other accidents in which the damage to the aircraft was serious. Of the total number of accidents to commercial airliners and business jets, nearly 70% have been attributed to errors on the part of the flight crew. In these accidents, errors of judgement were a causal factor in 50% of the cases.
There were 37 major accidents between 1980 and 1990 attributed to flight crew errors and subsequent analyses of these accidents identified over 300 human errors as a contributOry cause). In each case there were identified al least eight human errors. 10 about 85% of those cases, the failures were in communication between the flight crew, or between the crew members and the Air Traffic Controller.
When these accidents were analysed further, it was found that about three-quarters of them involved fatigue and pressure to meet time schedules. Training programmes such as Line~Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) and Crew Resource Management (CRM) -which is compulsory in the UK, but nowhere else -have been widely adopted by airlines who are convinced that such trai ning programmes are the key contributors to breaking these causal chains.
CFIT accidents
Such accidents have been widely reported and have been reduced recently as a consequence of using special airborne equipment which was specifically introduced into airline operations to prevent such accidents and to restore a perceived loss of publie confidence in air travel.
In the late 1970s there were, each year, about seven CFIT accidents involving commercial air transport. That figure fell to less than four per year in the 1980s, and a figure of about four per year has occurred since. However, CFlT accidents have represented about one-fifth of al1 the hull losses of Western builtjels since 1975. Even though the number of hull losses has reduced, CFIT accidents remained the largest single cause of fatalities in large commercial jet aeroplanes from 1990 to 1996. In 80% of these accidents the awareness and alertness of the pi lot, and in the remaining 20% communications between the flight crew and Air Traffic Control (ATe), were the principal factors. From a study of 156 CFIT accidents, the Flight Safety Foundation of the USA deduced that the most common reasons for this type of accident were those shown below: The world fleet of jet airliners is almost entirely equipped with either GPWS or EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System). EGPWS was introduced because the early GPWS were unreliable: they gave occasional false warn ings which induced pilots to disregard the warnings andlor to disable the equipment. ln over one-third of the cases between 1982 and 1993, a reported major cause of CFIT accidents was the lack of a serviceable GPWS. However, it must be made clear that, while it is certain that GPWS equipment can assist pilots to avoid accidents, it was found that, in more than haIf the C FIT acc idents recorded, the aeroplane involved in the accident was equipped with GPWS; and, in 40% of those accidents, the aeroplane had been equipped with a functioning GPWS. In 40% of the accIdents it was concluded that the accident had happened in spite of a GPWS alert. Human error, therefore, remains the largest primary cause of accidents.
EGPWS uses a world-wide digital terrain database to enhance tile performance of conventional G PWS which is based on radio-altimetry. Rather than the 10-30 seconds aural warning before potential impact provided by such a standard GPWS, EGPWS can provide a warning of up to I minute before. Yet pi lots sti 11 have to be properly trained to be able to respond sufficiently quickly to such warnings.
Mid-air collisions
In August 1986 there was a mid-air collision over Cerritos, Cali fornia, between a DC-9 of Aeromexico and a small, private aeroplane. All lives were lost. But since Cerritos is close to Los Angeles, the US Congress acted swiftly (by government standards) to protect all large American cities from the effects of such mid-air collisions. It mandated that any passenger aircraft with more tha.n 30 seats, flying in US airspace, must be equipped with a Traffic and Collision Alerts System (TeAS).
TCAS provides pilots with information to improve their situational awareness. It has been particularly helpful in those areas of the world where the ATC system is highly developed, but which are very busy, e.g. the USA and Europe. Starting The system has several modes which provide aural alerts to the aircraft about different unsafe terrainproximity conditions. These messages are summarised in Table 2 . Artificial voice technology is used to provide the aural warnings.
After a warning or alert message has been given, the aircrew is expected to initiate an appropriate recovery manoeuvre in the time available. The aeroplane's tl ighl path during this recovery manoeuvre can be broken down into three phases (see Figure 4) . These phases are: response time; roll recovery; and dive recovery.
The minimum recovery altitude (MRA) has to be set by the pilot. TCAS J provides only a proximity warning. It helps flight crew to visualy acquire any intruder into the airpace of their aeroplane. Nowadays Its use is confined to general aviation and commuter aircraft. From its interrogation of nearby aircraft transponders it provides range and bearing as a TA. [t will track the other aeroplanes and compute the collision convergence times and the altitude separation between aeroplanes. It does NOT provide climb or dive commands: it is the flight crew of the TCAS aircraft the US Congress) until 1994 to allow for necessary improvements. Since that date all commercial aeroplanes operating in the USA must be equipped with TCAS. With effect from the beginning of this year, passe\lger aeroplanes with 30 or more seats flying in Europe must also be equipped with TCAS.
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.The Basic TeAS system only proVIdes Traffic Alert (TA) infonnation; the Advanced systems provide both TA and recommended courses of action.
TCAS is a secondary radar system: it interacts with Mode S transponders fitted on other aircraft in its vicinity and with the ATC radar. It interrogates the transponders on other aircraft and it responds to interrogation from other aircraft transponders. It provides audio messages to th.e flight crew and simultaneously displays on a screen tbe location of all transponder-equipped aircraft in its vicinity. TCAS cannot provide protection against aircraft without transponders. During the response time phase, the flat terrain is assumed there is then no pilot '!'aintains the~ircraft on its pres-risk of hitting the gro~nd, i.e. the aeroen! flIght path at Its current attitude plane is assumed to have recovered without reaction to th~warnings or when its flight path angle is zero. alert: the duration of thIS phasc correIt is obvious that the pilot's reaction spon~s to the pilot's reacti~m time. As time, is significant in determining the the pIlot reacts to the warnmg or alert, likelihood of recovering the aircraft the roll recovery phase starts. The from a specified MRA. However. pll~t commands a roll .manoeuvre aeroplane variables can oscillate vigũ~t ll the aeropl.a~e attams a near orously about their mean values, mgs-level condItion and then, in the which can cause considerable probdIve recovery phase, a pull-out is ini-]ems for a GPWS. The measured radar tiat~d at a given onset r~te of load height is a particularly sensitive signal unt.t1 a targ.et lo~d ractor IS. reache.d. because it is used in conjunction witb ThIS value IS mamtaIned untt! the alr-the aeroplane's horizontal velocity to craft recovers, by which it is meant predict the height of the terrain in that the distance between the aero-front of the aeroplane. Although there plan~and t~e terrain is incr~ing and are many causes of false alarms, the the aIrcraft IS flYing abo~e Its MRA3.
chief one is the signal from the radar Th~helg~t of !he terrain forward of altimeter. Obviously such false alarms the aIrcraft IS estimated by calculating are undesirable so considerable filterthe horizontal distance travelled by the ing of the input signals to the GPWS aeroplane during the dive recovery is required. phase, and by knowing the angle to the terrain at the start of the dive. Although TeAS crude, the simplest method of estimating horizontal distance during this phase is to calculate the distance covered ,during the recovery period, assummg that the horizontal velocity is the same as the aeroplane's forward velocity along the flight path. Aviation safety -McLean _ Commercial air transport is still the safest fonn of travel and will remain so in the future, even with the considerable growth that is being experienced at present and which is predicted 10 continue into the future.
The mandatory introduction of Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems into commercial transport aeroplanes operating in tne USA and Europe will continue to contribute to a reduction in CF1T accidents, and the use of TCAS should prevent serious mid-air collisions between transponder-equipped aircraft.
Notwitbstanding tbe considerable gains in aviation safety which the introduction of such avionic systems secures, there remains a need for comm ercial air transport to introduce training schemes, such as the Advanced Qualification Programme, and to produce effective Safety Management Schemes to deal with all the activities in aviation such as maintenance, ground control and even loading, as well as flight operations, if the objective of reducing serious air accidents by 50% is to be achieved by 2005.
Conclusions
(at the same time the target symbol on the visual display is changed from yellow to red).
TeAS TA display
When the TCAS has detected an intruder, the system helps the pilot to see (visually acquire) the intruding aeroplane. System data is updated once every second, and can include relative ( relative position of traffic on a visual display, which m3Y be a dedicated one, or it may be on a multi-functional flat CRT screen in a glass cockpit aircraft, or it may be amalgamated on the weather map of the Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS).
The RA display for TCAS II and III is a standard vertical speed indicator (VS!) modified to indicate to the flight crew the vertical rate required to maintain safe separation. There are also associated red and green indicatOr lights: for complete compliance with the RA the flight crew should keep the VS! needle out of the Red Zone.
Aural Signal Unit. Both the aural RA and TA messages are synthetic voice messages. Whenever an aeroplane (a target) infringes the envelope of the protective airspace, an aural TA is sounded: '1""RAFFIC. TRAFFIC. TRAFFIC". (Simultaneously on the visual display the target aircraft is changed from a white to a yellow symbol).
! f the target is designated as an immediate threat, the aural RA sounds: "CLIMB. CLIMB. CLIMB" 
TeAS components
The components involved in a TCAS are shown in Figure 6 .
The Mode S transponder carries out modes A, C and S transponder TIlOCtions. The TCAS computer monitors the airspace surveillance, tracks intruders in the airspace, detects threats within the airspace, and generates the advisories.
The TCAS J (TA display) shows the Figure 6 : TeAS system. who must decide on the appropriate evasive action. TCAS JJ provides both TA and Resolution Advisory (RA) infonnation. It recommends particular manoeuvres to the flight crew, but only in tbe vertical plane. It is chiefly used by passenger aeroplanes and, sometimes, business jets.
TCAS 1fJ provides both TA and RA in both vertical and horizontal planes. The TA is an audio and visual alarm which is provided to the Oight crew whenever the TCAS has determined that there are other aircraft on possible collision courses. RAs provide the crew with solutions to the traffic problem, including borizontal avoidance commands. 
